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Уголовное законодательство о противодействии коррупции
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США
Rauh W.J. Changing ethics policies without scandal: state responses to published reports and the importance of accurate information. Public Integrity. 2016. Vol. 18. Iss. 3. Pp. 208-335.
Roberts R. History of the legalization of executive branch ethics regulation. Public Integrity. 2007. Vol. 9. Iss. 4. Pp. 313-332.
Rosenson B.A. The costs and benefits of ethics laws. International Public management Journal. 2005. Vol. 8. Iss. 2. Pp. 209-224.
Rosenson B.A. The impact of ethics laws on legislative recruitment and the occupational composition of state legislatures. Political Research Quarterly. 2006. Vol. 59. Iss. 4. Pp. 619-627.
Saglibene D. The U.K. Bribery Act: a benchmark for anti-corruption reform in the United States. Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems. 2014. Vol. 23. Iss. 1. Pp. 119-145.
Siewert W., Udani A. Missouri municipal ethics survey: do ethics measures work at the municipal level? Public Integrity. 2016. Vol. 18. Iss. 3. Pp. 269-289.
Thompson J.R. Public values in context: a longitudinal analysis of the U.S. civil service. International Journal of Public Administration. 2016. Vol. 39. Iss. 1. Pp. 15-25.
Wang Y. The reasons for China to sentence some bribery offenders to death. Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics. 2016. Vol. 44. Pp. 1-17.
Wessing J., Ahlbrecht H., Dann M. US corruption proceedings in Germany. Business Law International. 2014. Vol. 15. Iss. 3. Pp. 183-200.
White R.S. What counts as corruption? Social Research. 2013. Vol. 80. Iss. 4. Pp. 1033-1056.
Wood G. A cross cultural comparison of the contents of codes of ethics: USA, Canada and Australia. Journal of Business Ethics. 2000. Vol. 25. Iss. 4. Pp. 287-298.

This paper examines cultural differences in individual decision-making in a corruption game. We define culture as an individual’s accumulated experience, shaped by the social, institutional, and economic aspects of the environment in which the individual lives. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we find that there is a greater variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behavior than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behavior across cultures. Consistent with the existing corruption indices, the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance of corruption than the subjects in Australia. However, the subjects in Singapore have a higher tolerance and the subjects in Indonesia have much lower tolerance of corruption than expected. We conjecture that this is due to the nature of the recent institutional changes in these two countries. We also vary our experimental design to examine the impact of the perceived cost of bribery and find that the results are culture-specific. 

Yang K. Institutional congruence, ideas and anticorruption policy: the case of China and the United States. Public Administration Review. 2009. Supplement 1. Vol. 69. Pp. 142-150.
Yap O. When do citizens demand punishment of corruption? Australian Journal of Political Science. 2013. Vol. 48. Iss. 1. Pp. 57-70.

Under what conditions do citizens demand punishment of corrupt government officials or actions? Citizens’ demands complement and motivate government actions. However, studies suggest that citizens’ demands are weak and not credible. This paper considers that credible demands are the outcomes of strategic interaction between citizen groups. The results from experimental surveys in Australia and the United States show citizens’ demands are credible across various conditions, including size of participants or groups, and regardless of whether they suffer losses from corruption, or whether other participants suffer losses from corruption.

This paper makes three contributions: First, the results delineate a theoretical model that predicts concerted action; this is a useful alternative to extant treatments that generally report outcomes where coordination problems and free-ridership undermine citizens’ concerted action and credibility. Second, the results also clarify several conditions under which citizens’ demands are credible, that is, when citizens act in concert to demand punishment. Third, the consistent results across Australia and the U.S., where individualism is high, provide useful baselines for further studies.

Абрамовская О.Р. Опыт противодействия коррупции в полиции США. Вестник Челябинского государственного университета. 2015. № 4 (359). С. 183-186.
Ардельянова Я.А. Эффективные модели социального контроля коррупционных отношений на примере зарубежных стран. Вестник Московского университета. Серия 18: Социология и политология. 2013. № 4. С. 162-176.
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