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Всего найдено: 1541
Общие вопросы
Киргизия
Жумабеков З.А. Роль государственного плана противодействия коррупции в формировании административно-правового антикоррупционного потенциала в государственных органах Кыргызской Республики. Экономика, социология и право. 2016. № 2. С. 118-121.
Козубаев А.К. Современное состояние и динамика коррупционной преступности в Кыргызской Республике. Новая наука: современное состояние и пути развития. 2016. № 2-2 (62). С. 205-210.
Муканова Н.А. Новые подходы в предупреждении коррупции в Кыргызской Республике: пути достижения прозрачности и подотчетности государственных органов. Журнал зарубежного законодательства и сравнительного правоведения. 2015. № 2. С. 172-176.
Осмоналиев К.М. Новое антикоррупционное законодательство Кыргызстана и проблемы правоприменительной практики. Вестник Кыргызско-Российского славянского университета. 2013. Т. 13. № 5. С. 73-77

Рассмотрены изменения, внесенные в законодательство Кыргызстана в 2012 г., корректирующие систему противодействия коррупции. 

Поляков М.М. Противодействие коррупции в странах Содружества Независимых Государств. Вестник Университета имени О.Е. Кутафина. 2014. № 2. С. 170-175
Китай
Birney M. Decentralization and veiled corruption under China’s “rule of mandates”. Decentralization and Governance, World Development. 2014. Iss. 53. Pp. 55-67.

This paper shows why corruption is especially difficult to detect under China’s system of decentralized authoritarian rule, which I call a “rule of mandates.” Local officials must pursue high priority political targets but have immense discretion over which laws to implement. A relative standard for corruption consequently arises since non-implementation of laws may be mandate- serving or may be corrupt; and determining which requires extra information on why non- implementation occurred. The theory is supported by evidence from original survey and case research on the implementation of the village elections law. I discuss implications for anticorruption efforts, development patterns, and future research. 

Broadhurst R., Wang P. After the Bo Xilai trial: does corruption threaten China’s future? Survival. 2014. Vol. 56. Iss. 3. Pp. 157-178.

A popular sentiment among Chinese that - corruption could lead to the end of the state and anti-corruption could lead to the end of the Chinese Communist Party - provides a unique perspective from which to interpret China’s current prospects for institutional reform. This paper offers an assessment of the scandal involving Chongqing party secretary, Central Politburo member and former Minister for Commerce Bo Xilai, and identifies the underlying reasons for the deepening of corruption in Chinese politics. We argue that campaign-style anti-corruption efforts such as President Xi Jinping’s crackdown on ‘tigers’ and ‘flies’ (powerful leaders and lowly bureaucrats) although useful for establishing the new leadership’s presence risk the same problems that have undermined ‘strike hard’ campaigns against crime. Such campaigns have limited impact on elite and systemic corruption and can be camouflage for proxy power struggles, which impede China’s political development.

Cai H., Henderson J.V., Zhang Q. China’s land market auctions: evidence of corruption? RAND Journal of Economics. 2013. Vol. 44. Iss. 3. Pp. 488-521.
Dai C. Corruption and anti-corruption in China: challenges and countermeasures. Journal of International Business Ethics. 2010. Vol. 3. Iss. 2. Pp. 58-70.

Like other developing countries, corruption is a serious challenge that China faces as it moves to modernize its economy and society. This paper examines what is different in the nature and extent of corruption in China compared to those of other nations based on its different political structure and reform policy. It differentiates the typologies of corruption and analyzes the causes and the dilemma that the country faces in wrestling with ways to eradicate corruption. Both theoretical explanation as well as empirical studies feature in the paper which concludes that for complete success in eradicating corruption, China would have to adopt the democratic system of checks and balances. 

Di Hu, Mingus M.S. The struggle between traditional and adopted public service values in China. Public Administration Quarterly. 2013. Vol. 37. Iss. 1. Pp. 129-141.
Dong B., Torgler B. Causes of corruption: evidence from China. China Economic Review. 2013. Iss. 26. Pp. 152-169.

This study explores the causes of corruption in China using two different regional level data sets (provinces and cities). We find that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, higher educational attainment, a historic influence from Anglo-American church universities, greater openness, more access to media, higher relative wages of government employees and a greater representation of women in the legislature are markedly less corrupt; whereas social heterogeneity, regulation and abundance of resources breed substantial regional corruption. We also find that fiscal decentralization depresses corruption significantly. Finally, we identify a currently positive relationship between corruption and economic development in China, one driven primarily by the transition to a market economy. 

Dong B., Torgler B. Corruption and social interaction: evidence from China. Journal of Policy Modeling. 2012. Vol. 34. Iss. 6. Pp. 932-947.
Fan J.P.H., Guan F., Li Z., Yang Y.G. Relationship networks and earnings informativeness: evidence from corruption cases. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 2014. Vol. 41. Iss. 7/8. Pp. 831-866.

The measurement difficulties arising from relationship-based business transactions can result in accounting opacity. We test this hypothesis by exploiting a natural experiment. Using a sample of firms that were networked with 45 high-level Chinese bureaucrats involved in corruption scandals between 1996 and 2007, we examine the patterns in the earnings informativeness of these firms before and after the exogenous break of the networks. We predict that the costs and benefits of business-politics relationships, which are not measurable by the current accounting systems, diminish the ability of accounting earnings to track a firm’s economic performance. In turn, a break in a political relationship due to anti-corruption enforcement reduces the measurement noise and improves the earnings informativeness. We find that, relative to the matched control firms, there is indeed a significant increase in the earnings informativeness of the networked firms following the public exposure of a scandal. Robustness tests fail to show that the documented improvement in the earnings informativeness is primarily due to systematic changes in the firms’ earnings management behavior or disclosure policies. 

Feng X., Johansson A.C. Underpaid and corrupt executives in China’s state sector. Journal of Business Ethics. 2016. 14 p.
Gong T. Managing government integrity under hierarchy: anti-corruption efforts in local China. Journal of Contemporary China. 2015. Vol. 24. Iss. 94. Pp. 684-700.

In contrast to the early campaign style anti-corruption strategy based on nationwide uniformity, disparate local integrity initiatives and programs have proliferated in China in recent years. Local innovation in managing government integrity has been encouraged by the Center. Drawing on the author's fieldwork in Guangdong, this article investigates the rationale behind such development and addresses the question of why the central leadership has become receptive to local initiatives in cadre management, an area where political conformity was deemed necessary by an authoritarian regime. It suggests that the strategic adjustment testifies to the institutional failure of the earlier anti-corruption regime that manifested in, inter alia, an acute agency loss problem. The emerging approach to integrity management nevertheless has paradoxical institutional roots. It indicates some new thinking by the central authorities on holding local governments responsible for integrity management. Just as clearly, the adjustment is also driven by the Center's concern about losing control and its desire to ‘manage’ government integrity under hierarchy.

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