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Индия
Jauregui B. Provisional agency in India: jugaad and legitimation of corruption. American Ethnologist. 2014. Vol. 41. Iss. 1. Pp. 76-(?).
Kato A., Sato T. The effect of corruption on the manufacturing sector in India. Economics of Governance. 2014. Vol. 15. Iss. 2. Pp. 155-178.
Mahajan A., Mahajan A. Code of ethics among indian business firms. Paradigm. 2016. Vol. 20. Iss. 1. Pp. 14-35.
Marquette H. “Finding God” or “moral disengagement” in the fight against corruption in developing countries? Evidence from India and Nigeria. Public Administration & Development. 2012. Vol. 32. Iss. 1. Pp. 11-26.
Miklian J., Carney S. Corruption, justice and violence in democratic India. SAIS Review of International Affairs. 2013. Vol. 33. Iss. 1. Pp. 37-49.

Institutionalized corruption is pervasive in India. It requires individuals and businesses to negotiate bureaucratic mazes, pay off government servants, and break laws merely to acquire the basic elements of governance. With nearly half of India’s economic activity in the informal sector, ‘shadow economies’ permeate the lives of every citizen. What on the surface looks like a dysfunctional or broken system operates smoothly and ben- eficially for the politicians, businesses, and connected individuals who use it with ease. For the average Indian citizen, however, access is challenging, and corruption is a visible reminder of the failed promise of democracy. This article broadens the anti-corruption agenda in India by recognizing how corruption carries with it ingrained structural components that cannot be disentangled from the formal sector. In some cases, what is thought of as ‘corruption’ actually improves operational efficiency for citizens when compared to India’s overworked judiciary and extensive bureaucracy. Any serious at- tempt to ‘fix’ corruption must also account for the rationalizations of individuals and companies that engage in what are commonly seen as corrupt activities. 

Quah J.S.T. Curbing corruption in India: an impossible dream? Asian Journal of Political Science. 2008. Vol. 16. Iss. 3. Pp. 240-259.

This article analyses the serious problem of corruption in India by examining its causes and the various anti-corruption measures employed by the government from the formation in 1941 of the first anti-corruption agency, the Delhi Special Police Establishment, which was expanded to form the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in April 1963. India’s ineffective anti-corruption strategy can be attributed to the lack of political will of its leaders and its unfavourable policy context, which has hindered the enforcement of the anti-corruption laws. The lack of political will in fighting corruption is manifested in the lowest per capita expenditure and least favourable staff- population ratio of the CBI when compared to those of its counterparts in Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Thailand. To enhance the CBI’s effectiveness, it should be removed from the jurisdiction of the police and be established as an independent agency dedicated solely to curbing corruption. The Constitution of India should also be amended to empower the CBI to investigate corruption cases at the state level without obtaining the consent of the chief minister of the state. In view of the lack of political will, this article concludes that curbing corruption in India remains an impossible dream in the foreseeable future. 

Riley P., Roy R.K. Corruption and anticorruption: the case of India. Journal of Developing Societies. 2016. Vol. 32. Iss. 1. Pp. 73-99.
Shafiq M.N. Aspects of moral change in India, 1990-2006: evidence from public attitudes toward tax evasion and bribery. World Development. 2015. Vol. 68. Pp. 136-148.

Observers have asserted that India’s economic rise coincides with moral change. This study assesses some notable aspects of this claim by using public attitudes toward tax evasion and bribery as indicators of moral values. Using repeated cross-sectional data from the World Values Surveys, I find that tolerance for tax evasion and bribery grew relatively slightly from 1991 to 1996, and then increased rapidly from 2001 to 2006. Double-interaction regression models show tolerance converging by gender and religion, and tol- erance diverging between the poor and non-poor. However, the regional patterns are complex. Finally, university educational attainment is associated with decreasing tolerance. 

Слонская М.С. Коррупция в Индии: масштабы и методы борьбы с ней. Азия и Африка сегодня. 2015. № 7. С. 28-33.
Индонезия
Alatas V., Cameron L., Chaudhuri A., Erkal N., Gangadharan L. Gender, culture and corruption: insights from an experimental analysis. Southern Economic Journal. 2009. Vol. 75. Iss. 3. Pp. 663-680.
Arifin T., Trinugroho I., Prabowo M.A., Sutaryo S., Muhtar M. Local governance and corruption: evidence from Indonesia. Orporate ownership and Control. 2015. Iss. 12. Pp. 194-199.
Budiman A., Roan A., Callan V.J. Rationalizing ideologies, social identities and corruption among civil servants in Indonesia during the Suharto era. Journal of Business Ethics. 2013. Vol. 116. Iss. 1. Pp. 139-149.
Cameron L., Chaudhuri A., Erkal N., Gangadharan L. Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore. Journal of Public Economics. 2009. Vol. 93. Iss. 7. Pp. 843-851.

This paper examines cultural differences in individual decision-making in a corruption game. We define culture as an individual’s accumulated experience, shaped by the social, institutional, and economic aspects of the environment in which the individual lives. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we find that there is a greater variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behavior than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behavior across cultures. Consistent with the existing corruption indices, the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance of corruption than the subjects in Australia. However, the subjects in Singapore have a higher tolerance and the subjects in Indonesia have much lower tolerance of corruption than expected. We conjecture that this is due to the nature of the recent institutional changes in these two countries. We also vary our experimental design to examine the impact of the perceived cost of bribery and find that the results are culture-specific. 

Chan S.F.X. What’s the law got to do with corruption in Indonesia? A case study for systems theory. Global Jurist. 2014. Vol. 14. Iss. 1-3. Pp. 67-99.
Davidson J.S. Politics-as-usual on trial: regional anti- corruption campaigns in Indonesia. Pacific Review. 2007. Vol. 20. Iss. 1. Pp. 75-99.
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