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Всего найдено: 1541
Общие вопросы
Великобритания
Трунцевский Ю.В. Корпоративные коррупционные риски (опыт Великобритании). Международное публичное и частное право. 2015. № 3. С. 41-44.
Трунцевский Ю.В., Богатов А.В. Добровольное раскрытие информации относительно фактов коррупции и мошенничества (зарубежный опыт). Актуальные вопросы публичного права. 2013. № 3 (15). С. 96-101.

На примере работы британского Отдела по борьбе с крупным мошенни­ чеством (SFO) рассматриваются пробле­ мы, препятствующие активному вклю­ чению компаний в сотрудничество с правоохранительными органами при совершении экономических преступле­ ний. Отмечается неспособность гаран­ тировать положительный результат для компаний, добровольно раскрывающих информацию относительно фактов коррупции и мошенничества. 

Яблонская Л.М. Этический кодекс полиции Северной Ирландии: значение в реформировании. Теория и практика общественного развития. 2011. № 5. С. 57-59

В статье анализируется опыт реформы полиции Северной Ирландии на основе стандартов, изложенных в Этическом кодексе. Этот опыт показывает важность служения населению, уважения граждан, отношения партнерства и сотрудничества, этичное поведение полицейских. Поэтому его успешно использовали в службах полиции Великобритании. Статья актуальна для России в связи с реформой полиции.

Венгрия
Batory A. Post-accession malaise? EU conditionality, domestic politics and anti-corruption policy in Hungary. Global Crime. 2010. Vol. 11. Iss. 2. Pp. 164-177.
Csaki C., Gelleri P. Conditions and benefits of applying decision technological solutions as a tool to curb corruption within the procurement process: the case of Hungary. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management. 2005. Vol. 11. Iss. 5-6. Pp. 252-(?).
Domokos L. Strengthening integrity against corruption: the Integrity Project of the State Audit Office of Hungary. International Journal of Government Auditing. 2015. Vol. 42. Iss. 3. Pp. 22-26.
Fazekas M., King L.P., Toth I.J. An objective corruption risk index using public procurement data. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research. 2016. 29 p.
Fazekas M., Toth I.J. From corruption to state capture: a new analytical framework with empirical applications from Hungary. Political Research Quarterly. 2016. Vol. 69. Iss. 2. Pp. 320-334.
Jancsics D. Imperatives in informal organizational resource exchange in Central Europe. Journal of Eurasian Studies. 2015. Vol. 6. Iss. 1. Pp. 59-68.

This paper challenges the mainstream social scientific approach that emphasizes “moral inferiority” in corruption and bribery in Central and Eastern Europe. We argue that in many cases, people participate in informal organizational resource exchanges not because of immorality or greed but rather because of powerful external forces. By using the case of contemporary Hungary to support this argument, this paper provides a systematic analysis of such imperatives. The findings of 50 in-depth qualitative interviews suggest that two main imperatives can be distinguished; macro-level social and meso-level organizational forces. Macro-level forces may be linked to historical paths, Hungary's socialist and pre-socialist social conditions, and its post-socialist welfare state development. Meso-level organizational forces are more general phenomena and can be found in many other countries in the world. Moreover, there are numerous categories within each theme. Some of them represent normative imperatives, while others are more material structural forces.

Jancsics D. Petty corruption in Central and Eastern Europe: the client’s perspective. Crime, Law & Social Change. 2013. Vol. 60. Iss. 3. Pp. 319-341.

This qualitative study examines the role of clients in petty corruption byanalyzing actual corrupt exchanges between ordinary citizens and low level publicand private employees in post-communist Hungary. Using a grounded theory approach,interviews reveal how clients from different social strata deal with low-levelagents in corrupt situations. Findings suggest two contrasting forms of low-levelcorruption: transactions where the client and the agent do not have a prior relationshipand where external factors dominate the relationship; and cases with stronger socialties between the actors, where the client has more freedom to structure the transac-tion. However, a client's social background frequently determines the form of corrupt transaction and the form of resources illegally exchanged in the deal.

Jancsics D. “A friend gave me a phone number” – brokerage in low-level corruption. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice. 2015. Vol. 43. Iss. 1. Pp. 68-87.

Corrupt exchanges are often brokered by a third party, but this phenomenon has not been satisfactorily explored by researchers of corruption. Literature on brokerage in general provides interesting models but they have not previously been applied to corrupt exchanges. Based on in-depth qualitative interviews with respondents who participated in actual corrupt transactions, this paper identifies several distinct brokerage types in low-level corruption in contemporary Hungary. The paper also provides explanation of variation in corruption brokerage in terms of actors' group affiliations, forms of the corrupt exchanges, brokerage mechanisms, as well as neutrality, benefit and motivation, risk distribution, and stability of the brokerage structure. Finally, we discuss some policy implications of corruption brokerage.

Jancsics D., Jávor I. Corrupt governmental networks. International Public Management Journal. 2012. Vol. 15. Iss. 1. Pp. 62-99.
Kohalmi L. The never-ending fight: economic and political corruption in Hungary. Danube: Law and Economics Review. 2013. Iss. 1. Pp. 67-82.

Every society must pay the “price of democracy” and in this price are “calculated” the rising number of crimes and the change in their quality, and also the unique alterati- ons of corruption, among other things. The fight against economic-political corruption is a risky question, because the hunters and the hunted, those who conduct and those who undergo impeachment, are often members of the same political elite. It is in the interest of tax-payers that public funds should not become cash bribes, and furthermore that the rule of corruption should not grow dominant in even a single sphere. If we consider the moral weakness of politicians as the genesis of economic and political corruption, then the appropriate anti-corruption strategy would be the right combination of penalty policy and payment policy. 

Pulay G. Preventing corruption by strengthening organizational integrity. Public Finance Quarterly. 2014. Vol. 59. Iss. 2. Pp. 133-148.

The article describes the theoretical basis of the integrity survey conducted by the state audit office of hungary and proceeds to assess the extent to which integrity controls have been established in the hungarian public sector based on the 2013 survey. The paper underlines that compliance with the legal requirements is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of integrity. Besides the mandatory rules, soft integrity controls influencing employees’ behaviour play an important role in ensuring that a public body operates in line with its declared principles and values. strengthening integrity is an effective means for preventing corruption as well. The data of the survey show that the establishment of an integrity-oriented organisational culture is at an early stage in the hungarian public sector. The majority of the institutions have developed their own fundamental internal regulations, but less than 40 per cent of them perform risk analysis. More than 50 per cent of respondents apply a number of ‘soft’ controls. The ratio of organisations which have introduced controls specifically against corruption is rather low. 

Szatmári J., Kakatics L., Szabó Z.G. Objectives, methodology and results of the Integrity Survey (2011-2013). Public Finance Quarterly. 2014. Vol. 59. Iss. 2. Pp. 164-186.

In 2013 the State Audit Office of Hungary assessed the level of integrity in the public sector for the third time. The results of these surveys have shown that corruption risks in the institutions examined are mainly associated with the public procurements processes and the utilization of EU funds. The change in institutional structure, legal status and regulatory environment may present corruption risks in public sector institutions. Controls which are designed to manage risks deriving from their legal status are in place in most public sector institutions. However, the institutions have to take further steps to reduce the negative effects of factors increasing the risk of corruption (for example public procurement, EU funding). In Hungary the public sector institutions need to develop their controls in connection with conflict of interest, relations with external partners or cooperation with experts. 

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