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Уголовное законодательство о противодействии коррупции
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Всего найдено: 1541
Общие вопросы
Болгария
Yalamov T. Hiding, circumvention, public procurement and shaping laws: the role of networks and bribery in Bulgaria. Eastern European Economics. 2012. Vol. 50. Iss. 5. Pp. 93-111.
Бразилия
Arrieta L.B. Taking the jeitinho out of Brazilian procurement: the impact of Brazil’s anti-bribery law. Public Contract Law Journal. 2014. Vol. 44. Iss. 1. Pp. 157-178.
Balán M. Surviving corruption in Brazil: Lula’s and Dilma’s success despite corruption allegations and its consequences. Journal of Politics in Latin America. 2014. Vol. 6. Iss. 3. Pp. 67-93.

This article analyzes the continued popular support for Lula and Dilma in the face of multiple corruption allegations throughout their respective presidencies. What explains their ability to survive corruption? And what are the implications of this – at first sight – lack of electoral punishment for Brazilian democracy? In searching for answers to these questions, this article looks at four mechanisms that help explain the continued popularity of politicians amid allegations of corruption: the use of clientelism as payoffs, informational failures, the relevance of other issues, and rouba mas faz.

By analyzing Lula’s and Dilma’s terms in office and their inopportune links to corruption, this article argues that the shifting strategies used to deal with corruption allegations effectively shifted the reputational costs of corruption away from individual political leaders and toward the Workers’ Party and the political system as a whole. This finding emphasizes the mid- to long-term consequences of corruption scandals on political parties and democratic institutions, while also shedding light on the paradoxical relationship between corruption as a voting valence issue and continuing electoral support for politicians allegedly involved in corruption. 

Baquero M. Corruption, political culture and negative social capital in Brazil. Revista Debates. 2015. Vol. 9. Iss. 2. Pp. 139-157.
Bassani L., Caffé C. Brazilian anti-corruption law. International Journal of Franchising Law. 2014. Vol. 12. Iss. 6. Pp. 45-48.
Bugarin M., Meneguin F.B. Incentivos a corrupcao e a inacao no servico publico: Uma analise de desenho de mecanismos / Стимулы для коррупции и инноваций на публичной службе: анализ дизайна механизмов. Estudos Economicos (Sao Paulo). 2016. Vol. 46. Iss. 1. Pp. 43-89. Электронный ресурс.
Caldas O.V., Costa C.M. Pagliarussi M.S. Corrupcao e composicao dos gastos governamentais: evidencias a partir do Programa de Fiscalizacao por Sorteios Publicos da Controladoria-Geral da Uniao / Corruption and the composition of governmental expenditure: evidence from Controladoria-Geral da Uniao's Public Random Drawing Inspection Program. RAP: Revista Brasileira de Administracao Publica. 2016. Vol. 50. Iss. 2. Pp. 237-264.
De Alencar C.H.R., Gico Jr. I.T. When crime pays: measuring judicial performance against corruption in Brazil. Law & Business Review of the Americas. 2011. Vol. 17. Iss. 3. Pp. 415-434.

There is a widespread perception in Brazil that civil servants caught in corrupt practices are not punished. Yet, until now, there was no hard evidence that would support such claim and some argued that this was just a mislead perception due to the recent increase in anti-corruption measures. One of the main reasons for this notably absence is that it is very difficult to identify actual cases of corruption to, then, measure whether or not they are actually punished by the judicial system. 

This paper proposes a method of measuring judicial system efficacy against corruption by comparing proven corruption cases punished by administrative committees with criminal and civil judicial performance for the same cases. Ours results show that in fact the Brazilian judicial system is highly ineffective in fighting corruption.

De Almeida M.A. Managing public perceptions: new wealth and corruption in Brazil. Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. 2012. Vol. 36. Iss. 2. Pp. 51-55.
Ferraz C., Finan F. Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil’s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2008. Vol. 123. Iss. 2. Pp. 703-745.

This paper uses publicly released audit reports to study the effects of disclos- ing information about corruption practices on electoral accountability. In 2003, as part of an anticorruption program, Brazil’s federal government began to select mu- nicipalities at random to audit their expenditures of federally transferred funds. The findings of these audits were then made publicly available and disseminated to media sources. Using a data set on corruption constructed from the audit re- ports, we compare the electoral outcomes of municipalities audited before versus after the 2004 elections, with the same levels of reported corruption. We show that the release of the audit outcomes had a significant impact on incumbents’ elec- toral performance, and that these effects were more pronounced in municipalities where local radio was present to divulge the information. Our findings highlight the value of having a more informed electorate and the role played by local media in enhancing political selection. 

Martins J.A.M., Knoerr F.G. O poder de policia e o compliance no estado de direito e sua influencia na lei anticorrupcao (lei n. 12.846 de 1° de agosto de 2013) / The power of policing and compliance in a legal state and their influence on the Anti-corruption law (law № 12.846 of the 1 of august, 2013). Revista Juridica. 2016. Vol. 1, Iss. 42. Pp. 49-78.
Pereira C., Melo M.A., Figueiredo C.M. The corruption-enhancing role of re-election incentives? Counterintuitive evidence from Brazil’s audit reports. Political Research Quarterly. 2009. Vol. 62. Iss. 4. Pp. 731-744.

Traditional wisdom on the effect of re-election on incumbent performance is that first-term politicians refrain from rent extraction because they want to be re-elected. The authors find no evidence to support this belief. The corruption-reducing effects of re-election may be offset when the expected utility for rent extraction is very high. This occurs when the likelihood of detecting corruption is very low. Mayors who committed irregularities are less likely to be re-elected when this information is released in the electoral year only. Although citizens hold mayors accountable for bad behavior, they do not do so to the point of discouraging misbehavior.

Praca S., Taylor M.M. Inching toward accountability: the evolution of Brazil’s anticorruption institutions, 1985-2010. Latin American Politics and Society. 2014. Vol. 56. Iss. 2. Pp. 27-48.

This article analyzes the evolution of the network of Brazilian federal accountability institutions over the course of the past generation, between the transition to democracy and the end of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's second term. Substantively, the article charts the significant gains that have been made in accountability institutions. Theoretically, it evaluates the evolution of these institutions as a consequence of the distribution of rules, routines, roles, and resources across a larger institutional network, demonstrating that changes in the various bureaucratic agencies have mutually reinforced each other and generated autocatalytic processes of reform.

Richard M. Brazil’s landmark anti-corruption law. Law & Business Review of the Americas. 2014. Vol. 20. Iss. 2. Pp. 357-362.
Winters M.A. Too many cooks in the kitchen: battling corporate corruption in Brazil and the problems with a decentralized enforcement model. Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business. 2015. Vol. 13. Iss. 4. Pp. 681-700. Электронный ресурс
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