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Уголовное законодательство о противодействии коррупции
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Всего найдено: 1541
Общие вопросы
Австралия
Uhr J. How do we know if it’s working? Australian Journal of Public Administration. 2005. Vol. 64. Iss. 2. Pp. 69-76.
Wood G. A cross cultural comparison of the contents of codes of ethics: USA, Canada and Australia. Journal of Business Ethics. 2000. Vol. 25. Iss. 4. Pp. 287-298.

This paper examines cultural differences in individual decision-making in a corruption game. We define culture as an individual’s accumulated experience, shaped by the social, institutional, and economic aspects of the environment in which the individual lives. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we find that there is a greater variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behavior than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behavior across cultures. Consistent with the existing corruption indices, the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance of corruption than the subjects in Australia. However, the subjects in Singapore have a higher tolerance and the subjects in Indonesia have much lower tolerance of corruption than expected. We conjecture that this is due to the nature of the recent institutional changes in these two countries. We also vary our experimental design to examine the impact of the perceived cost of bribery and find that the results are culture-specific. 

Yap O. When do citizens demand punishment of corruption? Australian Journal of Political Science. 2013. Vol. 48. Iss. 1. Pp. 57-70.

Under what conditions do citizens demand punishment of corrupt government officials or actions? Citizens’ demands complement and motivate government actions. However, studies suggest that citizens’ demands are weak and not credible. This paper considers that credible demands are the outcomes of strategic interaction between citizen groups. The results from experimental surveys in Australia and the United States show citizens’ demands are credible across various conditions, including size of participants or groups, and regardless of whether they suffer losses from corruption, or whether other participants suffer losses from corruption.

This paper makes three contributions: First, the results delineate a theoretical model that predicts concerted action; this is a useful alternative to extant treatments that generally report outcomes where coordination problems and free-ridership undermine citizens’ concerted action and credibility. Second, the results also clarify several conditions under which citizens’ demands are credible, that is, when citizens act in concert to demand punishment. Third, the consistent results across Australia and the U.S., where individualism is high, provide useful baselines for further studies.

Вейберт С.И. Государственная политика в области противодействия коррупции в отдельных странах Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона: сравнительный анализ. В сборнике: Актуальные проблемы научного обеспечения государственной политики Российской Федерации в области противодействия коррупции. Сборник трудов по итогам Всероссийской научной конференции. Отв. Ред. В.Н. Руденко; ред. К.В. Киселев, Е.А. Степанова, В.В. Эмих. Екатеринбург. 2014. С. 408-414.

В статье автор с точки зрения компаративистики проводит анализ про- тиводействия коррупции в отдельных странах Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона. Рассмотрена государственная политика противодействия коррупции в Новой Зеландии, Сингапуре, Австралии и Соединенных Штатах Америки. Отмечена достаточная разработанность законодательства в сфере противодействия коррупции в Новой Зеландии, Сингапуре, Австралии и США. Приведены основополагающие нормативно-правовые акты, содержащие нормы антикоррупционной направленности. Последовательно выделены особенности государственной политики США, Новой Зеландии, Сингапура, Австралии. Сделан вывод о том, что впечатляющие результаты противодействия коррупции в этих странах связаны прежде всего с оздоровлением экономики в целом, реформированием государственной службы, изменением подходов к формированию целостности государственного устройства.

Австрия
Becker S.O., Boeckh K., Hainz C., Woessmann L. The empire is dead, long live the empire! Long-run persistence of trust and corruption in the bureaucracy. Economic Journal. 2016. Vol. 126. Iss. 590. Pp. 40-74.
Скворцова Е.А. Правовые механизмы противодействия коррупции в странах Европы. Вестник Федерального арбитражного суда Московского округа. 2013. № 2 (15). С. 128-133.
Аргентина
Balán M. Competition by denunciation: the political dynamics of corruption scandals in Argentina and Chile. Comparative politics. 2011. Vol. 43. Iss. 4. Pp. 459-478.

In the last two decades, corruption has become a key concern throughout the world. Most of what we know about corruption comes from instances in which misdeeds become public, usually generating a scandal. Why do some acts of corruption become corruption scandals and others do not? This article argues that scandals are not triggered by corruption per se, but that corruption scandals are initially caused by the dynamics of political competition within the government. Government insiders leak information on misdeeds in order to gain power within the coalition/party in power. A powerful opposition, contrary to common beliefs, acts as a constraint for insiders, making corruption scandals less likely.

These arguments are evaluated using empirical evidence from two paradigmatic Latin American cases, Argentina and Chile, from 1989 to 2008. The findings presented support the notion that corruption scandals emerge as a consequence of political competition. 

Di Tella R., Franceschelli I. Government advertising and media coverage of corruption scandals. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 2011. Vol. 3. Iss. 4. Pp. 119-151.
Jorge G., Basch F. How has the private sector reacted to the international standard against transnational bribery? Evidence from corporate anticorruption compliance programs in Argentina. Crime, Law & Social Change. 2013. Vol. 60. Iss. 23. Pp. 165-190.
Manzetti L. Accountability and corruption in Argentina during the Kirchners’ era. Latin American Research Review. 2014. Vol. 49. Iss. 2. Pp. 173-195.

This article highlights an important paradox: in Argentina between 2003 and 2013 the center-left Peronist government’s approach to governance mirrors that of the center-right Peronist administration of the 1990s. While the latter centralized authority to pursue neoliberal reforms, the former have centralized authority in the name of ex- panding government intervention in the economy. In both cases, corruption has tended to go unchecked due to insufficient government accountability. Therefore, although eco- nomic policies and political rhetoric have changed dramatically, government corruption remains a constant of the Argentine political system due to the executive branch’s ability to emasculate constitutional checks and balances. 

Muir S. On historical exhaustion: Argentine critique in an era of “total corruption”. Comparative Studies in Society & History. 2016. Vol. 58. Iss. 1. Pp. 129-158.
Армения
Coxson S.L. Assessment of Armenian local government corruption potential. Public Administration & Development. 2009. Vol. 29. Iss. 3. Pp. 193-203.
Moore S.A. In the shadow of the law: an examination of corruption and the rule of law in Armenia. Boston University International Law Journal. 2013. Vol. 31. Iss. 1. Pp. 189-216.
Sahakyan N., Stiegert K.W. Corruption and firm performance. Eastern European Economics. 2012. Vol. 50. Iss. 6. Pp. 5-27.
Sholderer O. The drivers of police reform: the cases of Georgia and Armenia. CEU Political Science Journal. 2013. Vol. 8. Iss. 3. Pp. 323-347.

This article analyzes cases of police reform aimed at eliminating corruption. It focuses on two cases sharing similar problems of corruption in the past but with different outcomes after undertaking police reform: Georgia and Armenia. It seeks to understand why police reform is more successful in Georgia than in Armenia and uses legal documents, external reports, and secondary literature in this cause. It concludes that the primary factor influencing the outcome is a change in the political elite. Other factors contributing to the outcome of the police reforms were the involvement of foreign actors, the content of the reform, and the magnitude of the corruption.

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