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Уголовное законодательство о противодействии коррупции
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Всего найдено: 1541
Общие вопросы
Hanousek J., Kochanova A. Bribery environments and firm performance: evidence from CEE countries. European Journal of Political Economy. 2016. Vol. 46. Pp. 14-28.
Hira A. Broken windows: why culture matters in corruption reform. Journal of Developing Societies. 2016. Vol. 32. Iss. 1. Pp. 1-16.
Huang C.-J. Is corruption bad for economic growth? Evidence from Asia-Pacific countries. North American Journal of Economics and Finance. 2016. Vol. 35. Pp. 247-256.
Соколов М.С. Теоретические и прикладные аспекты противодействия коррупции: российский и зарубежный опыт. Вопросы безопасности. 2016. № 1. С. 15-26. Электронный ресурс.
Австралия
Alatas V., Cameron L., Chaudhuri A., Erkal N., Gangadharan L. Gender, culture and corruption: insights from an experimental analysis. Southern Economic Journal. 2009. Vol. 75. Iss. 3. Pp. 663-680.
Appleby G., Le Mire S. Judicial conduct: crafting a system that enhances institutional integrity. Melbourne University Law Review. 2014. Vol. 38. Iss. 1.

Judges are human. It is their humanity that allows them to pass judgement on the complexities of fact and law in cases before them. However, their humanity also means they are subject to the usual gamut of human frailties. Problematic judicial conduct remains rare in Australia. However, failing to acknowledge and address it has the potential to damage the integrity of the courts and undermine the ability of individual judges to fulfil the judicial function. In this article we examine the requirements for a ‘good’ complaints system through a comparative analysis of systems operating in Australia and overseas. We proffer an alternative system for Australia, tailored to fit within our constitutional constraints whilst promoting the institutional integrity of the judiciary. 

Blackham A., Williams G. The accountability of members of Australia’s federal parliament for misconduct. Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal. 2013. Vol. 13. Iss. 1. Pp. 115-156.
Bowman D., Gilligan G. Public awareness of corruption in Australia. Journal of Financial Crime. 2007. Vol. 14. Iss. 4. Pp. 438-452.
Bricknell S. Corruption in Australian sport. Trends & Issues in Crime & Criminal Justice. 2015. Iss. 490. Pp. 1-11.
Briggs L. Testing APS ethics: where’s the integrity? Australian Journal of Public Administration. 2009. Vol. 68. Iss. 2. Pp. 119-136.
Bronitt S. Policing corruption and corporations in Australia: towards a new national agenda. Criminal Law Journal. 2013. Vol. 37. Iss. 5. Pp. 283-295.

Local and international public opinion polls suggest that Australia is a low-risk country in terms of corruption. This article challenges this reputation contending that the relative invisibility of corruption in Australia is the result of low levels of enforcement of existing laws, and the political failure to implement a co-ordinated national strategy against corruption. As a result, Australia has become increasingly vulnerable to corrupt overseas politicians seeking a safe haven for their illicit assets. These enforcement vulnerabilities extend also to cases of foreign bribery perpetrated offshore by Australian corporations, employees and agents. Enforcement of foreign bribery offences in Australia, unlike the equivalent United Kingdom offences, is hampered by an overly broad defence which excuses “facilitation payments” that otherwise would constitute acts of bribery. The conclusion is that an urgent review of the effectiveness and scope of anti-corruption laws is needed, combined with a much stronger political and law enforcement commitment to tackle corruption at home and abroad. 

Brown J., Loosemore M. Behavioural factors influencing corrupt action in the Australian construction industry. Engineering Construction & Architectual Management. 2015. Vol. 22. Iss. 4. Pp. 372-389.
Cameron L., Chaudhuri A., Erkal N., Gangadharan L. Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore. Journal of Public Economics. 2009. Vol. 93. Iss. 7. Pp. 843-851.

This paper examines cultural differences in individual decision-making in a corruption game. We define culture as an individual’s accumulated experience, shaped by the social, institutional, and economic aspects of the environment in which the individual lives. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we find that there is a greater variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behavior than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behavior across cultures. Consistent with the existing corruption indices, the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance of corruption than the subjects in Australia. However, the subjects in Singapore have a higher tolerance and the subjects in Indonesia have much lower tolerance of corruption than expected. We conjecture that this is due to the nature of the recent institutional changes in these two countries. We also vary our experimental design to examine the impact of the perceived cost of bribery and find that the results are culture-specific. 

Der Wal Z., Graycar A., Kelly K. See no evil, hear no evil? Assessing corruption risk perceptions and strategies of Victorian public bodies. Australian Journal of Public Administration. 2016. Vol. 75. Iss. 1. Pp. 3-17.
Dowding K., Lewis C. Newspaper reporting and changing perceptions of ministerial accountability in Australia. Australian Journal of Politics & History. 2012. Vol. 58. Iss. 2. Pp. 236-250.
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